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Abstract 
Latin America has a long history of political violence that 
include civil wars; guerrilla movements, military intervention, coup 
d’état, terrorism and others form of violent confrontation. As conflict 
and terrorism (C-T) produces losses of human lives and destroy assets 
and property there is an obvious need for prevention and insurance 
against this kind of risk. Insurance can be provided by both the state 
and by the market. In countries subject to long and violent conflict 
there is need for direct provision of insurance and compensation to the 
victims of conflict and their families.  However, also private insurance 
for C-T risks can be developed. The development of market insurance 
for these contingencies require adequate pricing, a solid financial base 
of insurance companies and mechanisms for shifting risk particularly 
when we are in presence of  “extreme events” that increase, 
substantially, the solvency risk of insurers. The losses of terrorist 
attacks are sometimes very large (over $ 50 billions associated with 
the attacks on the twin towers on September 11, 2001, in New York 
City).  The “ extreme event syndrome’ calls for some degree of state 
intervention to secure the solvency of insurance market institutions in 
the wake of large contingencies. Efficient public intervention requires 
an adequate understanding of issues of incentive-compatibility, moral 
hazard and risk diversification that are central in the theory and 
practice of insurance mechanisms. 
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I. Introduction 
Political violence, conflict, terrorism cause severe dislocation to 
societies, often lead to losses of human lives and destroy economic 
assets. The causes of terrorism and conflict are very complex, often 
related to grievances associated with perceived social and economic 
injustices, the quest for political power and ideological, ethnic or 
religious motivations. The prevention of conflict and terrorism (C–T 
hereafter) is a very complex task that involves a combination of 
resources, intelligence capacities, institutional reforms that foster a 
culture of dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflict. Ultimately, 
economic progress and development are essential for peace and social 
stability.  
As conflict and terrorism produces losses of human lives and 
destroy assets and property there is a need for insurance against this 
kind of risk. Insurance can be provided by the state and the market. In 
countries subject to long and violent conflict there is need for direct 
provision of insurance and compensation to the victims of conflict and 
their families. However, also private insurance for C–T risks can be 
developed. The development of market insurance for these 
contingencies require adequate pricing, a solid financial base of 
insurance companies and mechanisms for shifting risk particularly 
when we are in presence of “extreme events” that increase, 
substantially, the solvency risk of insurers as they severely strain the 
financial capacity of private insurance companies. The losses of 
terrorist attacks are sometimes very large—think, for example, of the 
cost of over U$ 50 billions associated with the attacks on the twin 
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towers on September 11, 2001, in New York City. The “ extreme event syndrome’ calls for some 
degree of state intervention to secure the solvency of insurance market institutions in the wake of 
large contingencies. Efficient public intervention requires an adequate understanding of issues of 
incentive–compatibility, moral hazard and risk diversification that are central in the theory and 
practice of insurance mechanisms.  
Latin America has a long history of political violence with internal conflicts of different 
intensity, ideological origins, players and dynamics. These conflicts include civil wars, guerrilla 
movements, military intervention, coup d’état, terrorism and others form of violent confrontation. 
According to the United State Department of State, the Latin American region has the highest 
number of international terrorist attacks in the world, although most of them are concentrated in a 
single country: Colombia.1  
This paper discusses analytical and policy issues on the causes of conflict and terrorism and 
the role for prevention and insurance. It also provides some empirical evidence on the incidence of 
these phenomena in the Latin American and Caribbean region in the second half of the 20th century 
with more concentration on the 1990s and early 21st century. The paper examines the scope and 
limits of public and market insurance for terrorism and conflict and highlights the role of public 
intervention in either providing basic insurance against these contingencies and/or in fostering the 





















                                                     
1
  See “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, 2002, United States Department of State.  
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II. Conflict and terrorism: 
definition and special features 
Political violence, present in the history of human kind for 
ages, takes several forms: wars among countries, internal 
conflict, guerrilla warfare, military overthrow of civilian 
governments, terrorism, etc. These forms of violence often lead 
to the loss of human lives, destroy economic assets and cause 
severe dislocations to normal economic activity and the daily 
lives of people. Thus, political violence generates welfare costs 
as well as material losses. The motivations, patterns and 
dynamics of conflict are multiple. The motivation of internal 
conflict is related to grievances associated with unequal patterns 
of distribution of wealth, assets, the lack of political rights, 
ideology and social exclusion. The propagation of conflict and its 
duration depends on access to finance by combating groups, on 
support among the population and on other causes. A recent 
World Bank study on civil conflict (WB, 2003) shows complex 
interactions between social groups, ethnicity, access to natural 
resources and social exclusion in triggering civil conflicts. In 
addition, this study shows that conflicts persist over time when 
the rebel groups have a steady financial base that support their 
fights. This can be due to the exploitation of rich natural 
resources with a high liquidity value such as diamonds, oil, coca, 
and others. Also rebel groups often receive financial 
contributions from Diasporas of nationals living abroad that 
sustain the armed conflict. 
Prevention and insurance of conflict and terrorism: issues and evidence for Latin America 
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There are some important differences between conflict and terrorism. Conflict involves 
regular armies and rebel groups and the scale of operations are much large than in the case of 
terrorism. Terrorist groups are often smaller than rebel armies and their targets are frequently 
civilians (and symbolic assets) rather than combatants of an opposite faction, although in conflict 
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III.  Empirical evidence on conflict 
and terrorism in Latin America 
Table 1 in the annex shows the incidence of armed conflict 
in Latin America in the period 1946–2001, classified according 
different degree of intensity, internal versus external conflict and 
type of rebel and insurgent groups.2 The evidence portrayed in 
table 1 shows that most of the internal conflicts were motivated by 
the interest of some of the groups in conflict to seize power, 
including the regular army through coup de état against elected 
governments. Large scale, sustained guerrilla warfare was 
observed in Cuba in the 1950s, in El Salvador in the 1980s, in 
Guatemala from the 1950s until the mid 1990s and in Colombia 
since the early 1960s until now.3 Wars among countries have been 
often short lived in Latin America; examples of this, include the 
conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua in 1957, between El 
Salvador and Honduras in 1969 and a short–lived war between 
Peru and Ecuador in 1995. 
What about terrorism? Table 2 shows that in the 1991–2002 
period, Latin America has the highest number of international 
terrorist attacks followed by Western Europe and Asia.4 However, 
those attacks are highly concentrated in one country: 
 
                                                     
2
  see Gleditsch, et.al., 2002 
3
  See Solimano, 2000 and Sanchez, Solimano and Formisano, 2003. 
4
  International terrorism in that publication is defined as terrorist acts that involve nationals of more than one country and assets of 
international corporations besides national infrastructure. The data on international terrorism for Latin America and other regions of 
the world comes from the U.S. State Department’s publication: “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, various issues. 
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Colombia, that accounts for around 88 percent of the international terroristattacks committed in 
Latin America (see table 3), followed, well–behind, by Peru. In the 1990s, there were other high 
profile terrorist attacks in the region: the bombing in 1992 of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires 
and the 1994 bombing of the Argentina–Israeli Community Center (AMIA).5  
 
                                                     
5
  Argentina also suffered from left–wing terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Important left–wing groups that adopted violent 
methods were the Montoneros and the ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army of Argentina) . Uruguay, over a similar period, also 
suffered from terrorism led by the Tupamaros. In the 1980s Peru was besieged by terrorist activity led by Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path). However, not all terrorist activity has been led by left–wing groups. During the right–wing military regimes of the 
1970s in the Southern Cone of Latin America, state–sponsored terror through kidnappings and shootings was responsible for 
thousand of deaths through the disappearance of people.  
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IV.  Prevention and insurance 
Important policy issues are the prevention of conflict and 
terrorism and the insurance against losses of life, property and 
destruction or damage of assets.  
Prevention 
Preventing civil conflicts and terrorism is not a simple task. 
Path dependence is an important feature of these phenomena. 
Countries or regions with a long history of conflict and terrorism 
(e.g. Colombia, Northern Ireland, Israel, the Basque country in 
Spain) have a higher probability of the continuation of conflict than 
a country with a history of peace and tranquility. At a broader level 
preventing conflict and terrorism is a complex task that involves 
economic, political and legal measures. A culture of negotiation and 
consensus can foster the peaceful resolution of potential conflicts in 
societies. In contrast, an easy access to arms and funding availability 
for rebel groups and individuals creates a better environment for 
conflict and terrorism to flourish. Economic development can also 
help preventing conflict. In fact, the World Bank (2003) study shows 
a lower incidence of armed conflict in countries with sustained 
economic growth and higher levels of per capita income than in poor 
and unstable countries. In contrast, the relationship between income 
per capita levels and terrorism is weak: we also see that terrorism 
occurs in medium income and high–income countries such as 
Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom, Spain and Israel and, 
recently, in the United States. 
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Insurance 
As conflict and terrorism cause economic damages and destroy human lives, people and 
societies are willing to invest resources to minimize those costs. Insurance against C–T risks can be 
provided by the public sector as in Spain, Israel, Ireland and other countries. The market also can 
provide private insurance for conflict and terrorism. Adequate pricing of C–T risks is one of the 
problems for the development of these markets. As insurance premiums are set in line with 
actuarial probabilities of events and the determinants of those probabilities, in the case of conflict 
and terrorism are not well known, pricing becomes a complex issue. Another potential impediment 
of the development of private insurance against these contingencies is the so –called problem of 
“extreme events” (large losses).6 Extreme events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, in 
New York City can generate losses that often exceed the financial capacity of insurance companies. 
In the twin towers attack, those losses were estimated in over 50 billion dollars (see Jaffee and 
Russell, 2002).7 These events have usually a low probability of occurrence, near 1 percent, but very 
high possible losses. The key for insurance markets to operate efficiently and companies to provide 
insurance against large expected losses is the existence of mechanisms to shift risks from agents 
that are exposed to risk to agents that have a low position in risky assets. Individuals or 
communities exposed to the occurrence of terrorist attacks or conflict are “long” in risky assets–say 
their properties or themselves are exposed to large potential losses. They need, thus, to diversify 
those risks. In turn, in the capital markets there are agents “short” in risky assets that in exchange 
for an attractive return would be willing to acquire those assets provided their risk structure is not 
correlated with other existing assets in their portfolios.  
Insurance companies, by pooling assets with different risk distributions (cars, houses, life 
insurance, etc), can reduce the costs of managing risks. However, in the case of conflict or big 
terrorist attacks their capital base, reserves and retained profits can be insufficient to absorb the 
occurrence of large contingencies. Therefore, companies face non–trivial bankruptcy risks when 
insuring events with large expected losses even if their probability of occurrence is low. To 
diversify risks, the insurance company may sell part of their risky portfolio to a reinsurance 
company. In turn, re–insurance companies also need to shift the risk of their policies to reduce 
insolvency risks.8 For this to happen, we need a liquid capital market that trade the suitable 
instruments able to transferring risk to agents with short exposure to risk but an appetite for good 
returns.  
Such an instrument is a security called cat (catastrophe) bonds.9 Cat bonds usually pay to 
investors a substantial premium, often near 10 percentage points over LIBOR in exchange for an 
asset whose principal can be lost in the event of a disaster to occur (unprotected principal).10 The 
key element of the bond is that in the event of extreme risk the investor may not recuperate the 
principal of the bond, relieving the issuer of the Cat Bond of a large liability. The Cat bond reduces 
the strain on the capital base and solvency of insurers in the event of very large losses.11 
 
                                                     
6
  A growing new literature has started dealing with these issues. See Froot (1999), Jafee and Russel (2002), Niehaus (2002), 
Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002), Woo (2002), Kunreuther (2002), Auffret (2003), Anderson, (2002). 
7
  Natural disasters,such as the hurricane Andrew that hit the state of Florida in the U.S. in 1992 generated losses of near 20 billion 
dollars. 
8
  In Paul Samuelson (1962)’s terms the issue is to partition risk among various agents and investors. 
9
  The classic theory of resource allocation of risk (Arrow, 1964, 1996; Debreu, 1959, Borch, 1974) shown that individuals can 
manage efficiently their exposure to contingent liabilities by taking (long and short) state–contingent, risk exchange securities. In 
practice, catastrophe (Cat) bonds are state–contingent, risk exchange securities that can transfer risks across agents. 
10
  Alternatively, the principal can be paid over ten years. The funds raised by the Cat bond are put in a trust account. This is another 
positive feature of these bonds since this reduces the credit risk of other instruments issued by insurance companies. 
11
  The attractive combination of return and risk has enabled individual issuances of Cat bonds for over 400 millions in the United 
States in the 1990s. 
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V. Public intervention and 
efficient insurance 
There are several instances in which the direct provision of 
public insurance is needed. For humanitarian considerations after a 
civil war or a large–scale conflict the families of victims of conflict 
often need to be compensated. This may take the form, for example, of 
for–life pensions to disabled former combatants and their families. 
After the end of the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador schemes 
of compensations were put in place by governments. In turn, countries 
such as Spain, South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland that have 
traditionally suffered from terrorist activity, governments have created 
public schemes of insurance against terrorism based on mandatory 
premiums and/or taxes on property (see Jaffee and Russel, 2002).12 
Publicly provided insurance for C–T risks, in the absence of a 
market for such risks, certainly fills a gap but also carry some potential 
costs. First, there is no assurance that the public insurance company 
will properly price C–T related risk, particularly if general taxes on 
property are used to generate funds for the agency. The result may be 
an inefficient allocation of risk insurance. Second, although the 
solvency risks of the public sector is lower than the solvency risk of 
private companies given the capacity of the government to enact taxes, 
at social level the risk assumed by the state may be shifted to the 
 
                                                     
12
  The case of Great Britain is interesting. A special agency called Pool Re, basically a mutual insurance company has been set up with 
the purpose of providing reinsurance of losses on commercial property sustained as a result of a terrorist attack (as defined by an 
enabling statute). The British government acts a re–insurer to Pool Re, therefore acting as an insurer of last resort, charging a 
premium to Pool Re only after the accumulated surplus reaches 1 billions pounds12. 
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private sector in unanticipated and inefficient ways (e.g. distortionary taxes can be levied). Third, 
an all–encompassing public insurance company can become a monopoly of insurance against 
terrorism, conflict and other forms of human–led disaster risk. As a result of this monopoly, 
competition is stifled and private markets for insurance may not develop.  
According to the theory of insurance an incentive compatible insurance scheme is one that 
leaves the insured (or the insurance company) to cover the initial layers of risk. As we move up in 
the risk layers, we need to go to the capital market or be financed by the government as insurer of 
last resort. In fact, when the government is willing to reinsure the top tier of losses that are beyond 
the capacity of an insurance company, then we refer to this as the government playing the role of 
insurer of last resort. 
In the United Kingdom the agency Pool Re (that provides terrorist insurance) is an example 
of a limited liability pool (LLP) combined with an insurer of last resort, the later function played by 
the British Treasury. In the United States, the California Earthquake Agency (CEA) is a LLP but 
without an explicit insurer of last resort like in the U.K.13 The combination of a state– provided 
LLP plus insurance of last resort has potential incentive problems that could be avoided by a 
market solution based on the securitization of insurance risk. In the British system, the allocation of 
insurance for high layers of risk is made by the state that provides insurance coverage for extreme 
events eliminating the risk of bankruptcy by the insurer. A market alternative is to transfer to 
investors in the capital market the risk of extreme events that generate large losses through a 
suitable security issued by insurance or reinsurance companies. That security could be the 
catastrophe bond of the kind we discussed before.  
Still this may not be really a “pure” market solution. In fact, to provide some “comfort” to 
investors, the government may acquire Cat Bonds tailored to cover the highest layers of C–T risks. 
In this case, the government would play, implicitly, the role of insurer of last resort through its 
commitment to buy Cat Bonds to insure high–risk layers. Another possibility to reduce high layers 
of risk is to open a credit line by the Central Bank to primary insurance companies operating in the 
segment of C–T risks. In this case, the Central Bank plays the role of creditor of last resort. In this 
scheme, the loan will be oriented to cope with liquidity problems associated with payment of 
insurance losses related to C–T risks. The loan can also cover capital of insurance companies 
depleted after the occurrence of insurance losses. Assets of the insurance firm would collateralize 
the loan and government debt will have priority over claims on equity by shareholders. However, 
government debt will have less priority than the liabilities to insurance policy holders. The key 
question is whether the lender of last resort function of government is a substitute of the role of 
insurer of last resort. The most likely case is that the market will not accept the solution of a lender 
of last resort as a full substitute of an insurer of last resort; if this is the case, the capitalization of 
insurance companies exposed to large losses may not take place without an insurer of last resort. 
Moral hazard issues 
Public insurance with mandatory premiums and no deductibles often create moral hazard 
problems. In turn, private insurance of risks associated with C–T events can reflect the risk of low 
mitigation by the insured agent charging higher premiums. Of course, too high a premium may 
“kill” a market, so premiums must be in line with the capacity and willingness to pay of the 
                                                     
13
  The agency of public insurance can be a quasi–public entity holding all C–T insurance risks backed by the capital base, reserves and 
retained profits. In this case, the actual entity managing the insurance can be a limited liability pool (LLP) whose resources available 
to pay claims are given by its own capital base, reserves and retained profits. A LLP has no claim on government resources (Jaffee 
and Russell, 2003). In the case of an extreme event policyholders may not be able to receive full payments for their losses according 
to the formal status of a LLP. Of course, there is always the possibility of a government to bail out the insured a practice that creates 
its own problems of moral hazard.   
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clients14. A combination of both self–insurance and market insurance would take care of the lower 
layers inducing a degree of prevention that reduce moral hazard. In addition to retention (e.g. the 
existence of deductibles) as a device to reduce moral hazard problems, it is important that the 
trigger under which the insurance payment is activated is beyond the control of the “cedent” (the 
entity that buys the policy or transfer the risk to other agent). 
The fact that the government is likely to play the role as insurer of last resort for high layers 
of C–T risk (or directly set–up a public insurance agency for all terrorist risk) creates, in principle, 
incentives for undertaking adequate prevention. Ultimately, the fight against terrorism is the 
domain, mainly, of governments, likewise the prevention of civil conflict.    
 
                                                     
14
  Froot (1999) analyzing the market insurance for natural disasters recommends insurance contracts and cat bonds that cut losses into 
layers, so that each contract has an associated limit, or maximum possible loss 
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VI. Final remarks 
Currently, in Latin America there is a clear lack of both public 
and private insurance mechanisms for facing the contingencies 
associated with political violence, conflict and terrorism. These events 
have had a significant incidence in Latin America in the recent past 
and create losses of human lives, destruction of assets and entertain 
social insecurity. Prevention of political violence, conflict and 
terrorism requires actions in several fronts: one is the development of 
a culture of understanding and peaceful resolution of conflict along 
with economic and institutional reforms that lift living standards and 
reduce inequality and exclusion. For humanitarian reasons there is a 
need of public insurance and compensation for victims and their 
families in countries that have suffered protracted and costly internal 
conflicts. At the same time, there is a potential scope for developing 
market insurance for terrorism and conflict related losses, provided 
incentives, risk and moral hazards issues are properly managed.  
The development of private insurance needs to adequately 
manage complex pricing problems of this kind of risk as well as 
handle the financial consequences of “ extreme events” in which a 
major terrorist attack (e.g. the New York City’s Twin Towers collapse 
on September 11) creates very high losses that strain the financial 
capacity of private insurance and reinsurance companies and create 
large bankruptcy risk. The problem of pricing of C–T risk may be 
particularly serious in the shaky area of terrorism and conflict, given 
the lack of precise and well–verified knowledge of the determinants 
and dynamics of these phenomena. In turn, solvency risk can be 
handled, in principle, through  suitable financial instruments that shift 
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risk from insurance companies to investors short in risky assets. Well–structured insurance 
schemes have the property of partitioning the layers of risk with self–insurance and market 
insurance taking care of initial layers of risk, leaving to international capital markets and public 
intervention to provide risk protection against “extreme events”. Moral hazard problems associated 
with too little mitigation and insufficient prevention is another dimension of the development of 
adequate insurance of terrorism and conflict risk. In any case, the social benefits of having 
adequate prevention and insurance mechanisms for these large contingencies are bound to be very 
large in historically conflicting Latin American societies. 
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Annex 
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Table 1 
ARMED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA, 1946-2001 
Country Objective  OPPOSITION ORGANIZATION YEAR 
Intensity Level 
* 
Argentina Government Military faction 1955 Minor 
   Military faction 1963 Minor 
   
ERP ( Revolutionary People's Army), Montoneros (left-wing armed branch of 
the Peronist Party) 1973-74 Minor 
    1975 War 
    1976-77 Intermediate [1] 
Argentina - UK Territory Malvinas/Falkland Islands  1982 War 
Bolivia Government Popular Revolutionary Movement 1946 War 
   
MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario: National Revolutionary
Movement)  1951 Minor 
   ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional: National Liberation Army)  1967 Minor 
Chile Government Military faction  1973 Minor 
Colombia Government 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas: Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia, ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional: National Liberation 
Army), EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación: People’s Liberation Army), M-19 
(Movimiento 19 de Abril: 19 April Movement), Faction of FARC, Faction of
ELN,MAO (Movimiento de Autodefensa Obrera: Workers’ Self-Defence 
Movement), Quintin lame [2] 1965-79 Minor [3] 
    1980-88 Intermediate [4] 
    1989-90 War 
    1991 Intermediate 
    1992-93 War 
    1994-97 Intermediate 
    1998-01 War 
Costa Rica Government National Liberation Army 1948 War 
Cuba Government Military faction  1953 Minor 
   Movimiento 26 de Julio: 26 July Movement 1957 Minor 
    1958 War 
   National Revolutionary Council, USA 1961 Minor 
Dominican 
Rep. Government Military faction  1965 Minor [5] 
Ecuador-Peru Territory   1995 Minor 
El Salvador Government Military faction 1972 Minor 
   
ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: People’s Revolutionary Army), FAL 
(Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación: Armed Liberation Forces), FARN (Fuerzas 
Armadas de Resistencia Nacional: Armed Forces of National Resistance),
FMPL (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Marti: Farabundo Marti 
Popular Liberation Forces), PRTC (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores 







El Salvador - 
Honduras Territory   1969 War 
Guatemala Government Military faction  1949 Minor 
   Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas 1954 Minor 
   
MR-13 (Movimiento Revolucionario Trece de Noviembre: 13 November 
Revolutionary Movement), FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes: Rebel Armed
Forces), EGP (Ejército Guerrilleros de los Pobres: Guerilla Army of the Poor), 
PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo:Guatemalan Worker’s Party), ORPA













    1992 War 
     1993-95 Intermadiate 
Haiti Government Tonton Macoute, Military faction  1991 Minor 
Honduras-
Nicaragua Territory   1957 Minor 
Mexico Government 
EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional: Zapatista National Liberation 
Army 1994 Minor 





Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Country 
Reason of  




FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional: Sandinista National
Liberation Front)  1978-79 War 
   Contras [8] 1981-82 Minor 
    1983-88 War 
     1989 Intermediate 
Panama Government Military faction  1989 Minor 
Panama-USA Government  1989 Minor 
Paraguay Government Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists)  1947 War 
   Military faction  1954 Minor 
   Military faction  1989 Minor 
Peru Government 
MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria: Movement of the
Revolutionary Left), Túpac Amaru [Guillermo Lobatón], ELN (Ejército de la
Liberación Nacional: the National Liberation Army) 1965 Minor 
   
SL (Sendero Luminoso: Shining Path), Sendero Rojo (Red Path), MRTA 
(Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement) 1980 Minor 
    1981-85 War 
    1986-87 Intermediate 
    1988-92 War 
    1993-99 Intermediate 
Surinam Government SLA (Surinamese Liberation Army)/Jungle Commando  1986-88 Minor 
Trinidad and 
Tobago Government Jama’at al-Muslimeen (Society of Muslims)  1990 Minor 
Uruguay Government 
MLN (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional: Movement of National Liberation) or
Tupamaros  1972 Minor 
Puerto Rico Territory Puerto Rican Nationalist Party  1950 Minor 
Venezuela Government Military faction  1962 Minor 
   Military faction (Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement for National Salvation)  1992 Minor 
 
Source: Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand (2002). 
‘Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset’, Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615–637. The latest vesion of this 
document  http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/ 
Note: * Minor armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths in that year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related  deaths 
during the course of conflict. Intermediate armed conflict: at least 25, but fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths in that 
year and an 
 accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in that year. Names of the opposition 
organizations are given in the local language, if available, and in English. 
1
 Possibly war in 1976–77. 
2
 Only FARC and ELN active in 1992–99. 
3
 It is unclear when the conflict changed from minor to intermediate. 
4
 Possibly war in several of the years. 
5
 Possibly war in 1965. 
6
 In 1980, FMLN (Frente Farabundo Marti para la liberación nacional: Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation) was 
formed by ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: People’s Revolutionary Army), FAL (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación:  
Armed Liberation Forces), FARN (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional: Armed Forces of National Resistance), FPL 
(Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Marti: Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces)  and PRTC (Partido  
Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos: Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers). 
7
 In 1980, URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) was formed 
by FAR (Fuerzas Armadas rebeldes: Rebel Armed Forces), EGP (Ejército Guerilleros de los Pobres: Guerilla Army of the 
Poor), 
PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo: Guatemalan Worker’s Party) and ORPA (Organización del Pueblo en Armas: 
Organization of Armed People). 













NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS BY REGION, 1991-2002 
Region 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1991-2002 1991-2002 
                    Total 
Annual 
Average 
 Africa 3 10 6 25 10 11 11 21 53 55 33 5 243 20.3 
 Asia 48 13 37 24 16 11 21 49 72 99 68 99 557 46.4 
 Eurasia 6 3 5 11 5 24 42 14 35 31 3 7 186 15.5 
 Latin America 229 143 97 58 92 84 128 111 122 192 201 50 1507 125.6 
 Middle East 78 79 100 116 45 45 37 31 26 20 29 29 635 52.9 
 North America 2 2 1 0 0 0 13 0 2 0 4 0 24 2.0 
 Westerm Europe 199 113 185 88 272 121 52 48 85 30 17 9 1219 101.6 
 Total 565 363 431 322 440 296 304 274 395 427 355 199 4371 364.3 
Source:Patterns of Global Terrorism, U. S. Department of State. 
Note: * The term "international terrorism" used by the U.S. State Department is the following "means terrorism 
involving citizens or territory of more than one country". This definition we assume includes foreigners as perpetrators 




NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS BY COUNTRIES * 
IN LATIN AMERICA, 1994-2002 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
    
 
            
Argentina 1   0 0 1 0 0 0 
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Chile 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Colombia 41 76 66 107 108 112 186 191 49 
Ecuador 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 
Peru 3 3 2 15 1 0 0 0 1 
Panama 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 
Other Countries 10 12 14 6 2 0 3 10 0 
Total 58 92 84 128 111 122 192 201 50 
Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, U. S. Department of State. 
Note: * The term "international terrorism" used by the U.S. State Department is the following 
"means terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one country". This definition we assume 
includes foreigners as perpetrators or victims and assets of foreign companies  
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Table 4 
COLOMBIA. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 






2000 1 037 
2001 795 
2002 1 171 
Source: National Department of Planning, 
Colombia. 
Note: *Terrorist attacks is the use of explosive 
like bomb, bomb car, cylinders of gas and 
sound bomb, directed to unamed individuals 




NUMBER OF HUMAN CASUALTIES CAUSED BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
ATTACKS*, 1991-2002 
REGION 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Africa 3 28 7 55 8 80 28 5379 185 102 150 12 
Asia 150 25 135 71 5 639 1507 344 635 690 904 651 1 281 
Eurasia 7 0 1 151 29 20 27 12 8 103 0 615 
Latin America 68 374 66 329 46 18 11 195 10 20 6 52 
Middle East 33 236 178 259 445 1 097 480 68 31 78 513 772 
North America 0 1 1 006 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 4 091 0 
Westerm Europe 56 65 117 126 287 503 17 405 16 4 20 6 
Total 317 729 1 510 991 6 454 3 225 914 6 694 940 1211 5 431 2 738 
Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, U. S. Department of State. 
Note: * The term "international terrorism" used by the U.S. State Department is the following "means terrorism 
involving citizens or territory of more than one country". This  
definition we assume includes foreigners as perpetrators or victims and assets of foreign companies and 




NUMBER OF FACILITIES STRUCK BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST 
ATTACKS IN THE WORLD*, 1991-2002 
Facilities Struck 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Business 377 249 280 130 338 235 327 282 278 383 408 111 
Diplomat 112 71 42 24 22 24 30 35 59 29 18 14 
Government 34 11 20 27 20 12 11 10 27 17 13 17 
Military 29 5 15 5 4 6 4 4 17 13 4 1 
Other 139 146 109 126 126 90 80 67 96 114 101 75 
Total 139 146 109 126 126 90 80 67 96 114 101 75 
Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism, U. S. Department of State. 
Note: * The term "international terrorism" used by the U.S. State Department is the following "means terrorism 
involving citizens or territory of more than one country". This  
definition we assume includes foreigners as perpetrators or victims and assets of foreign companies and 
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